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Abstract
We prove completeness of preferential conditional logic with respect to convexity over finite
sets of points in the Euclidean plane. A conditional is defined to be true in a finite set of points
if all extreme points of the set interpreting the antecedent satisfy the consequent. Equivalently,
a conditional is true if the antecedent is contained in the convex hull of the points that satisfy
both the antecedent and consequent. Our result is then that every consistent formula without
nested conditionals is satisfiable in a model based on a finite set of points in the plane.
The proof relies on a result by Richter and Rogers showing that every finite abstract convex
geometry can be represented by convex polygons in the plane.
1 Introduction
Preferential conditional logic was introduced by Burgess [9] and Veltman [40] to axiomatize the
validities of the conditional with respect to a semantics in models based on ordering relations. In
this semantics a conditional ϕ  ψ is true with respect to an order over a finite set of worlds if
the consequent ψ is true at all worlds that are minimal in the order among the worlds at which
the antecedent ϕ is true. Preferential conditional logic is sound and complete in this semantics
with respect to models that are based on arbitrary preorders. But both Burgess and Veltman note
that for completeness it suffices to consider partial orders. The axioms of preferential conditional
logic are a weakening of the axioms in Lewis’ conditional logic [26], which is sound and complete
for models that are based on strict weak orders, which are in bijective correspondence with total
preorders.
Similar semantic clauses as in conditional logic, and thus analogous axiomatic systems, have
later also been used in default reasoning [35, 24], in belief revision theory [17, 33] and in dynamic
epistemic logic [7, 36]. It should also be mentioned that the axiomatizations of conditional logics
with respect to their order semantics is similar to the characterizations of choice functions that are
rationalizable by some preference relation [5, 34]. Moreover, the semantic clause for the conditional
in orders, which is often attributed to [26], goes back to an earlier semantic clause for conditional
obligations in deontic logic [18].
Preferential conditional logic has also been shown to be complete with respect to semantic
interpretations that are quite different from the semantics in terms of partial orders. Most notable
are the interpretation of validity of inferences between conditionals as preservation of high condi-
tional probability [1, 14] and premise semantics, where the conditional is interpreted relative to a
premise set. A premise set is a family of sets of worlds, thought of as propositions that encode
relevant background information from the linguistic context [39, 23]. In this paper we provide yet
another interpretation to preferential conditional logic. We show that it is complete with respect
to convexity over finite sets of points in the Euclidean plane. This places conditional logic into
the tradition of modal logics with a natural spatial semantics [37], most famous of which is the
completeness of S4 with respect to the topology of the real line [30, 8].
To illustrate our semantics consider the finite set of points in Figure 1. Think of these points
as satisfying propositional letters as indicated in their label. For instance the point pqr in the
upper right corner satisfies q and r but not p. Our semantics is such that a conditional ϕ ψ is
true relative to such a set of points if the set of points at which ϕ is true is completely contained
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true conditionals:
(p ∨ q) r
(¬p ∨ ¬q) ¬p
⊤ (p↔ q)
false conditionals:
p r
¬r  ¬q
⊤ r
pqr pqr
pqr
pqr
pqr
Figure 1: A finite set of points in the plane and examples of conditionals that are true or false
relative to this set of points.
in the convex hull of the set of points at which both ϕ and ψ are true. Recall that a convex set
is a set that for any two points in the set also contains the complete line segment between these
points. Intuitively, these are the sets without holes or dents. The convex hull of a set is the least
convex set that contains the set. In Figure 1 the conditional (p∨ q) r is true because all points
at which p ∨ q is true are contained in the convex hull, which is the shaded area in the figure, of
the the points where p ∨ q and r are both true. The conditional p r is however not true in the
example because the point pqr satisfies p but it not contained in the convex hull of the points pqr
and pqr, which are all the points that satisfy p and q.
An equivalent formulation of our semantic clause is that a conditional ϕ  ψ is true if the
consequent ψ is true at all the extreme points of the set of points where the antecedent ϕ is true.
An extreme point of some set is a point in the set that is not in the convex hull of all the other
points from the set. Intuitively, the extreme points of some set are the outermost points of that
set. In the example from Figure 1 we have that pqr, pqr and pqr are the extreme points of set
that is shaded. On the other hand pqr is not an extreme point of the shaded set because it is
in the convex hull of the points pqr, pqr and pqr. Note that in this formulation of the semantic
clause for a conditional ϕ ψ the extreme points of the set of points satisfying the antecedent ϕ
play a role that is analogous to the minimal ϕ-worlds in the order semantics.
The main result of our paper can be stated as follows: All finite constellation of points in the
plane of the kind as shown in Figure 1 satisfy all the theorems in preferential conditional logic and
every formula that is not a theorem of the logic is false in some such constellation. We consider
this link between conditional logic and the geometric notion of convexity to be a curiosity that is
worth studying just because of its simplicity and elegance. We do not claim that our semantics
provides any new insights into the meaning of conditionals in natural language or into the structure
of defeasible reasoning.
The completeness proof from this paper consists of two steps:
1. We first observe that preferential conditional logic is complete for a semantic in models based
on finite abstract convex geometries.
2. We then show that every finite abstract convex geometry can be represented by a finite set
of points in the plane in such a way that all true formulas of conditional logic are preserved.
Combining these two results we obtain our completeness result because by the first step every
consistent formula ϕ is true in some finite model based on abstract convex geometries and by the
second step this model can be transformed into a concrete model based on points in the plane
where ϕ is true. We describe these two steps in greater detail.
In the first step we make use of the notion of a convex geometry [13, 21, 3]. Formally, con-
vex geometries are families of sets that are closed under arbitrary intersections and have the
anti-exchange property, which is a separation property that is somewhat reminiscent of the T0
separation property in topology. Convex geometries provide a combinatorial abstraction of the
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notion of a convex set in Euclidean spaces, such as the Euclidean plane. This is somewhat analo-
gous to how topological spaces provide an abstraction from the notions of open and closed sets in
Euclidean spaces. The convex sets in any subspace of an Euclidean space form a convex geometry.
But it is not the case that every abstract convex geometry, or even every finite abstract convex
geometry, is isomorphic to a subspace of some Euclidean space. An easy way to see this is to
observe that in any Euclidean space all singleton sets are convex, which is not enforced by the
definition of a convex geometry.
One can view the semantics in convex geometries as a generalization of the order semantics
over partial orders. The family of upwards closed sets in any partial order form a convex geometry.
Moreover, a conditional is true relative to a given partial order if and only if it is also true in the
convex geometry of all upwards closed sets in the order. Note that this especially means that the
completeness of the order semantics entails the completeness of the semantics in abstract convex
geometries.
To understand the relation between the order semantics, the semantics in abstract convex
geometries and the semantics for convexity between finite set of points in the plane it might
be helpful to think of an analogy with the different semantics for the modal logic S4. Both,
preferential conditional logic and S4, have a relatively concrete relational semantics in terms of
partial orders for preferential conditional logic and in terms of preorders, that are transitive and
reflexive relations, for S4. Both logics have an abstract spatial semantics, the semantics in convex
geometries for preferential conditional logic and the semantics in topological spaces for S4. In
both cases the abstract spatial semantics generalizes the relational semantics. For preferential
conditional logic this is done by considering the upward closed sets in the partial order as a convex
geometry. For S4 one can also considers the upwards closed sets in a preorder, which form a
so called Alexandroff topology. Both logics additionally have a concrete spatial semantics, over
finite set of points for preferential conditional logic and over the whole real line for S4. In both
cases proving completeness for the concrete spatial semantics requires extra work. For preferential
conditional logic this is the construction mentioned in the second step above and in the case of S4
it is the theorem of McKinsey and Tarski.
The semantics in abstract convex geometries can also be seen as a further development of
premise semantics. The convex sets in our semantics play the role of the complements of the sets
of worlds in the premise set of premise semantics. There is, however, a crucial difference in the
semantic clause with which a conditional is interpreted in a family of sets of worlds. Motivated
by linguistic considerations premise semantics uses a quite sophisticated semantic clause that
is insensitive to closing the family of sets under intersections. In [31, 16] it is observed that
for developing proof systems for preferential conditional logic it is beneficial to lift the implicit
assumption that family of sets of worlds, relative to which the conditional is evaluated, is closed
under intersections. To achieve this they use a simplified semantic clause from [28] that is sensitive
to closure under intersections. When one uses the conditional with this semantic clause relative
to a family of sets of worlds that is not closed under intersection different formulas turn out to be
true as would be true relative to the same family of sets of worlds using the semantic clause from
premise semantics. Thus, it is helpful to distinguish this new setting from premise semantics and
call it neighborhood semantics.
This neighborhood semantics is also the starting point for the categorical correspondence in
[29]. Based on earlier work in the theory of choice functions [22, 19] this paper establishes a
correspondence between the Boolean algebras with additional structure that encodes non-nested
preferential conditional logic and families of subsets of the atoms of these algebras. To obtain a
well-behaved correspondence it is necessary to allow for families of sets that are not closed under
intersections. However, one can require closure under unions and a separation property that is
dual to the anti-exchange property mentioned above. If one then considers the complements of
all the sets in a such a family of sets then one obtains a new family that is closed under arbitrary
intersections and that has the anti-exchange property. Thus one gets a convex geometry.
The second step of our proof is to show that for every abstract convexity there is a finite
subspace of the plane that satisfies the same formulas in conditional logic. This step is not
trivial because, as we already explained above, not every finite convex geometry is isomorphic
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to a subspace of some Euclidean space. However, following [20], there has recently been a rich
literature on representing finite convex geometries inside of Euclidean spaces [10, 11, 32, 2]. The
main result of [20], for which [32] give a much shorter proof, is that every finite convex geometry
is isomorphic to the convex geometry of a finite set of points in the plane, if we use an alternative
notion of convex set that is slightly different from the standard notion of convex set in the plane.
Moreover, [32] show that every finite convex geometry is isomorphic to the convexity over polygons
in the plane, where we use the standard notion of convexity, but every point in the original convex
geometry corresponds to a whole polygon in the plane. The papers [10, 11, 2] investigate to what
extend it is possible to prove the same result using circles instead of polygons.
For the second step of our completeness proof we make use of the representation by [32], where
a finite convex geometry is represented by a set of polygons in the plane. This set of polygons
is such that the extreme points of any two polygons in the set is disjoint. One can thus define a
function that maps an extreme point of some polygon in the set to the point in the original convex
geometry that the polygon is representing. The domain of this function can be considered to be
the finite subspace of the plane consisting of all the points that are an extreme point of one of the
polygons. The crucial insight is then that this function is a strong morphism of convex geometries
in a sense defined in [29], which guarantees the preservation of true formulas in conditional logic.
2 Convex geometries
In this section we recall some basic terminology and results related to abstract convex geometries.
For a more thorough introduction see [13, 3] or [21, ch. 3]
2.1 Basic definitions
A convex geometry (W, C) is a set W together with a family C ⊆ PW of convex sets that has the
following properties:
1. C is closed under arbitrary intersections, that is,
⋂
X ∈ C for all X ⊆ C.
2. C has the anti-exchange property that for every C ∈ C and x, y ∈ W with x, y /∈ C there is
a D ∈ C with C ⊆ D such that x ∈ D and y /∈ D, or x /∈ D and y ∈ D.
We sometimes use just W , or just C, to denote the convex geometry (W, C) consisting of both W
and C. Thereby it is assumed that the identity of the other component is understood from the
context.
Most authors require that ∅ ∈ C. We do not require this because, as we explain in Remark 3.3,
it is convenient for the semantics of conditional logic to allow for convex geometries in which the
empty set is not convex.
We call the complements of convex sets feasible, following the literature on antimatroids [21,
ch. 3]. The family of all feasible sets is denoted by F = {W \ C | C ∈ C}. We use the notation
X =W \X to denote the complement of some X ⊆W .
Given any subset X ⊆W its convex hull co(X) ⊆W is defined as
co(X) =
⋂
{C ∈ C | X ⊆ C}.
Because convex sets are closed under intersection the convex hull co(X) is a convex set. In fact it
is the least convex set containing X . One can also show that as an operation on PW the convex
hull co : PW → PW defines a closure operator, meaning that X ⊆ Y implies co(X) ⊆ co(Y ),
X ⊆ co(X), and co(co(X)) ⊆ co(X) for all X,Y ⊆ W . The relation between the family of
convex sets and the convex hull is an instance of the well-known correspondence between complete
meet-semilattices and closure operators.
For every subset X ⊆ W , where (W, C) is a convex geometry, we define the relative convexity
on X as follows: A set C ⊆ X is convex in the relative convexity if there is some set C′ that is
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convex in W such that C = C′ ∩X . It is not hard to see that the relative convexity is a convex
geometry.
The prime example of a convex geometries are the families of convex sets in the Euclidean space
Rn for every dimension n. A set C ⊆ Rn is convex if it contains the complete line segment between
any two of its points. This means that for all x, y ∈ Rn we need {λx+ (1− λ)y | λ ∈ [0, 1]} ⊆ C.
we call the family of convex sets defined in this way the standard convexity. It is well know that
the convex hull of a set X ⊆ Rn in the standard convexity is the set of all convex combinations
of points in X , where a convex combination of x1, . . . , xk ∈ X is any point that can be written as∑k
i=1 λixi, for λ1, . . . , λk ≥ 0 with
∑k
i=1 λi = 1.
Another example of convex geometries are partially ordered sets. Because the standard se-
mantics of conditional logic is usually defined over partially ordered sets this example provides the
link between convex geometries and conditional logic. Recall that a partially ordered set, or just
poset, is a set W together with a partial order ≤ on W , where a partial order is a binary relation
that is reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric. Given a partial order ≤ on W we define the upset
convexity U(≤) on W to consists of all the upward closed sets in ≤, that is, all the sets C such
that x ∈ C and x ≤ y implies y ∈ C. The convex hull of a set X ⊆W is then identical to the set
X↑ = {y ∈ W | x ≤ y for some x ∈ X}, which is the upwards closure of X . Note that U(≤) is just
the Alexandroff topology associated to the order ≤. Closure under arbitrary intersections is thus
obvious. The anti-exchange property follows from the T0 separation property of any Alexandroff
topology that is defined from a poset. The reason that in this paper we prefer to think of the order
semantics as being based on posets instead of just preorders is that the Alexandroff topology of a
preorder that is not anti-symmetric does not have the T0 separation property and thus it is not a
convex geometry.
2.2 Extreme points
A point x ∈ X in some set S ⊆ W in a convex geometry (W, C) is an extreme point of X if
x /∈ co(X \ {x}). The intuition is that an extreme point of X is an outermost point of the set X .
The extreme points of a set in the upset convexity of a poset are precisely the minimal elements
of the set. We write ex(X) ⊆ X for the set of all of its extreme points of X . The following
proposition yields an alternative characterization for the set of extreme points.
Proposition 2.1. For every X ⊆W we have ex(X) =
⋂
{Y ⊆ X | X ⊆ co(Y )}.
Proof. For the contrapositive of the ⊆-inclusion take x ∈ X such that there is some Y ⊆ X with
x /∈ Y and X ⊆ co(Y ). Then x ∈ co(Y ) ⊆ co(X \ {x}) and so x is not an extreme point of X .
For the contrapositive of the ⊇-inclusion consider an x ∈ X with x ∈ co(X \ {x}). Set
Y = X \ {x}, and observe that X ⊆ co(Y ) but x /∈ Y .
For finite sets one has the following relation between extreme points and the convex hull
operator.
Theorem 2.2. The following are equivalent for every finite set K ⊆ W in a convex geometry C
on W :
ex(K) ⊆ X iff K ⊆ co(K ∩X) for all X ⊆W.
Proof. This follows from item 3 of Theorem 1 in [29] and the observation that every finite set is
smooth in the terminology of that paper. Note that the proof of this theorem uses the character-
ization from Proposition 2.1 as the definition of the extreme points.
Lastly, we define the notion of a polygon. A polygon P ⊆ W in a convex geometry (W, C) is
any set that can be written of the form P = co(P ′) for a finite set P ′ ⊆ P . Clearly every such
polygon has only a finite number of extreme points because for any x ∈ P with x /∈ P ′ we have
that x ∈ co(P ′) ⊆ co(P \ {x}).
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3 Conditional logic
In this section we discuss the syntax of preferential conditional logic that we use in this paper and
explain its semantics in convex geometries.
3.1 Syntax of one-step preferential conditional logic
Conditional logics are commonly formulated in a classical propositional modal language with one
binary modality  , which forms the conditional ϕ  ψ with antecedent ϕ and consequent ψ
[26, 9, 40]. That  is a modality means that one can nest conditionals, as for example in the
formula (((p  q)  r) ∧ q) → r. In this paper we choose not to deal with the complications
arising from nested conditionals and instead just work with one-step formulas that are Boolean
combination of conditionals over propositional formulas. This is not a substantial restriction
for most conditional logics, because the axiomatizations of these logics constrain only one layer
of conditionals and then are extended freely to formulas of larger conditional depth. Readers
familiar with coalgebraic modal logic might recognize this as the one-step setup that is common
in coalgebraic logic [25]. We sketch in Remarks 3.2 and 7.1 below how one would extend our
semantics and completeness result to formulas with nested conditionals.
To be more precise about our setting fix a set Prop of propositional letters and consider the
grammar
ϕ0 ::= p | ¬ϕ0 | ϕ0 ∧ ϕ0, where p ∈ Prop,
ϕ1 ::= ϕ0  ϕ0 | ¬ϕ1 | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ1.
Let L0 be the set of formulas generated from ϕ0 and L1 the set of formulas generated from ϕ1.
Note that L0 is just the language of classical propositional logic. In both L0 and L1 we use further
Boolean connectives, such as ∨, →, and ↔, as abbreviations with their usual meaning in classical
logic. To omit parenthesis we assume that ¬ binds stronger than ∧ and ∨, which in turn bind
stronger than  , → and ↔.
In our axiomatization of preferential conditional logic we follow the one-step setup in that we
only consider proofs in which all formulas are either from L0 or from L1. Hence, proofs are not
allowed to contain nested conditionals or formulas with conditionals that contain propositional
letters that are not in the scope of a conditional.
As axioms we allow all instances of propositional tautologies in L0 plus the following axioms
that are in L1:
(Id) p p, (And) (p q) ∧ (p r)→ (p q ∧ r),
(CM) (p q) ∧ (p r)→ (p ∧ r q), (Or) (p q) ∧ (r  q)→ (p ∨ r  q).
We have the following inference rules: First, modus ponens, where the premises are either both
in L0 or both in L1; second, uniform substitution ϕ/ϕ[σ], where either ϕ ∈ L0 and σ : Prop→ Li
for some i ∈ {0, 1}, or ϕ ∈ L1 and σ : Prop→ L0; and third, we have the following two inference
rules, with premises in L0 and conclusion in L1:
(LLE)
ϕ↔ χ
(ϕ ψ)↔ (χ ψ)
, and (RW)
ψ → χ
(ϕ ψ)→ (ϕ χ)
.
The axioms and rules given here and their names closely follow the rules of System P in the
literature on nonmonotonic consequence relations [24]. It is however easy to show that these rules
and axioms are interderivable with the rules and axioms from [9] or [40].
The following proposition gathers examples of derivable formulas and rules.
Proposition 3.1. The following formulas are derivable in preferential conditional logic:
(WCM) (p q ∧ r)→ (p ∧ q  r), (CCut) (p q) ∧ (p ∧ q  r)→ (p r),
(S) (p ∧ q  r)→ (p ¬q ∨ r), (CCut’) (p q) ∧ (q  r)→ (p ∨ q  r).
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The following rule is derivable in preferential conditional logic:
(R)
ψ → χ
(ϕ ψ)→ ((ϕ ∧ χ) ∨ ψ  ψ)
.
Proof. In the following description of the derivations we omit the steps that only use propositional
reasoning and only focus on the axioms or rules involving the conditional.
Derivation of (WCM): From p  q ∧ r we can derive with the help of (RW) that p  q and
that p r. With (CM) it follows that p ∧ q  q.
Derivation of (S): First observe that from (Id) we get that p∧¬q  p∧¬q and with (RW) we
obtain p ∧ ¬q  ¬q ∨ r. Then use (RW) again to obtain p ∧ q  ¬q ∨ r from p ∧ q  r. We can
then use (Or) to get (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ ¬q) ¬q ∨ r. By (LLE) we obtain p ¬q ∨ r.
Derivation of (CCut): From p ∧ q  r it follows by (S) that p ¬q ∨ r. Combining this with
the assumption p q using the and rule we obtain p (¬q ∨ r)∧ q. By (RW) follows that p r
because (¬q ∨ r) ∧ q → r is a theorem of classical propositional logic.
Derivation of (CCut’): First derive p ∨ q  q using (Or), (Id) and the assumption p  q.
Then observe that by (LLE) we obtain (p ∨ q) ∧ q  r from the assumption q  r. Then apply
(CCut) to p∨ q  q and (p∨ q)∧ q  r, substituting the letter p in (CCut) with p∨ q. This yields
p ∨ q  r.
Derivation of (R): Because of the premise that ψ → χ we obtain ψ  χ with (RW) from the
assumption that ϕ ψ. Applying (CM) to ϕ ψ and ψ  χ yields ϕ∧ χ ψ. Because ψ  ψ
holds by (Id) we can use (Or) to get (ϕ ∧ χ) ∨ ψ  ψ.
3.2 Semantics of the conditional in convex geometries
To give a semantics to the conditional we are using models that are based on abstract convex
geometries as defined in Section 2. Thus, we define a model M = (W, C, V ) to consist of
• a set W , whose elements are called points or worlds,
• a convex geometry C ⊆ PW over W , and
• a function V : Prop→ PW that is called the valuation function.
As is usual in modal logics the valuation function V is used to assign meanings to the propositional
letters in Prop. This assignment of meanings is extended to propositional formulas from L0 in the
standard way with the recursive clauses
JpKV = V (p), J¬ϕKV =W \ JϕKV , and Jϕ ∧ ψKV = JϕKV ∩ JψKV .
We often write JϕK for JϕKV if V is clear from the context.
We use the standard clauses for the propositional connectives over L1 relative to the model
M = (W, C, V )
M |= ¬ϕ iff not M |= ϕ, and M |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M |= ϕ and M |= ψ.
The conditional has the following semantics:
M |= ϕ ψ iff for all C ∈ C with JϕK * C there is a D ∈ C
with C ⊆ D and JϕK * D such that JϕK ⊆ D ∪ JψK.
A routine argument shows that preferential conditional logic is sound relative to this semantic
clause. Note that soundness already holds if C ⊆ PW is an arbitrary family of sets, it is not
necessary that C is a convex geometry.
If we allow C ⊆ PW to be an arbitrary family of sets then our semantics is equivalent to
the neighborhood semantics that has already been used in the literature [28, 31, 16]. Thus the
semantics in convex geometries specializes the neighborhood semantics for preferential conditional
logic. Note that this entails that the semantics in terms of convex geometries inherits soundness
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from the neighborhood semantics. To see why our semantics specializes neighborhood semantics
let us dualize the semantic clause such that it is expressed in terms of the family F of feasible
sets. It then becomes the clause
M |= ϕ ψ iff for all F ∈ F with F ∩ JϕK 6= ∅ there is a G ∈ F
with G ⊆ F and G ∩ JϕK 6= ∅ such that G ∩ JϕK ⊆ JψK.
This clause is already used for arbitrary families F ⊆ PW in [28, 31, 16]. It can be traced back to
much earlier approaches in premise semantics [39, 23, 38] and can also be seen as the generalization
of the clause from [15] to the infinite case.
Remark 3.2. By making the convex geometry in a model depending on the world of evaluation,
one can extend our semantics to deal with nested conditionals. This means that we would consider
models of the form M = (W, C, V ), where C :W → PPW is such that C(w) is a convex geometry
for all w ∈ W . The conditional is then evaluated relative to a world w by using the above clause
relative to the convex geometry C(w). In [31, 16] this kind of semantics is used, however, with the
dualized semantic clause and without requiring that C(w) is a convex geometry.
Remark 3.3. Observe that if in some model M = (W, C, V ) we have that JϕK ⊆ C for all C ∈ C
then M |= ϕ  ⊥. In this sense the worlds in
⋂
C can be thought of as impossible worlds. We
do not require that ∅ ∈ C because we want to allow W to contain such impossible worlds. For the
results of this paper this is not crucial because, as we argue in Proposition 5.1 below, impossible
worlds can always be eliminated from W , without changing the set of true conditionals. In more
complex settings, such as the nested semantics from Remark 3.2 or the duality results from [29],
it is however convenient to allow for impossible worlds.
If the antecedent of a conditional ϕ ψ evaluates to a finite set JϕK then the semantic clause
for the conditional can be simplified.
Proposition 3.4. For any model M = (W, C, V ) and ϕ, ψ ∈ L0 such that JϕK ⊆ W is finite the
following are equivalent
1. M |= ϕ ψ,
2. ex(JϕK) ⊆ JψK, and
3. JϕK ⊆ co(JϕK ∩ JψK).
Proof. The equivalence of items (2) and (3) follows from Theorem 2.2. Hence, it suffices to show
that items (1) and (3) are equivalent.
Assume that M |= ϕ ψ and consider any C ∈ C such that JϕK ∩ JψK ⊆ C. We want to show
that then JϕK ⊆ C. If this was not the case then it would follow from M |= ϕ  ψ that there is
some D ∈ C with C ⊆ D such that JϕK * D and JϕK ⊆ D∪ JψK. These latter two inclusions entail
that JϕK ∩ JψK * D, contradicting JϕK ∩ JψK ⊆ C ⊆ D.
For the other direction assume that JϕK ⊆ co(JϕK ∩ JψK). We derive a contradiction from the
assumption that not M |= ϕ  ψ. The goal is to construct an infinite, strictly increasing chain
C0 ⊆ C1 ⊆ . . . of convex sets such that Ci * JϕK and (Ci+1 \ Ci) ∩ JϕK 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N. This
then contradicts the assumption that JϕK is finite.
Because we assume that not M |= ϕ  ψ there is some C ∈ C with C * JϕK such that for
every D ∈ C with C ⊆ D and D * JϕK we have that JϕK * D ∪ JψK. Let C0 = C.
To construct Ci+1 from Ci assume that we have a Ci ∈ C such that Ci * JϕK. From the
assumption that JϕK ⊆ co(JϕK ∩ JψK) it follows that there is some x ∈ JϕK ∩ JψK such that x /∈ Ci.
Because C = C0 ⊆ Ci we obtain from the choice of C that JϕK * D ∪ JψK. Thus, there is some
y ∈ JϕK such that y /∈ Ci and y /∈ JψK. Because x ∈ JψK it follows that x 6= y and thus we can
apply the anti-exchange property to obtain a convex set C+ with Ci ⊆ C+ that contains precisely
one of x and y. We set Ci+1 = C
+. Since both x and y are in JϕK, but none of them is in Ci, it
follows that Ci+1 * JϕK and (Ci+1 \ Ci) ∩ JϕK 6= ∅.
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Example 3.5. The picture in Figure 1 from the introduction represents for instance a model
M = (W, C, V ) which is such that
• W = {x, y, z, u, v} ⊆ R2 with x = (0, 5), y = (4, 5), z = (2.4, 3), u = (1.9, 4.3), v = (1.2, 1.5),
• C is the relative convexity of W in R2, and
• V (p) = {x, z, u}, V (q) = {x, y, u} and V (r) = {x, y, z}.
Example 3.6. As the running example for our completeness proof we use the following formula
α = (⊤ p) ∧ (q  p) ∧ (¬(p↔ q) p) ∧ ¬(¬q  p) ∧ ¬((p↔ q) p) ∧ ¬(¬p ¬q).
A relatively simple model M = (W, C, V ) in which α is true is as follows:
• W = {pq, pq, pq, pq} is a four element set,
• C = {∅, {pq}, {pq}, {pq, pq}, {pq, pq}, {pq, pq},W \ {pq},W \ {pq},W}, and
• V (p) = {pq, pq} and V (q) = {pq, pq}.
Example 3.7. Every model in the order semantics of the form M = (W,≤, V ), where ≤ is a
partial order over W , yields a model M ′ = (W,U(≤), V ) in the sense defined here. In fact M
and M ′ satisfy the same conditionals. In the finite case this follows from the reformulation of our
semantic clause in Proposition 3.4 and the observation that the minimal elements of some set in a
poset are precisely its extreme points in the upset convexity. In the infinite case we leave it to the
reader to check that the semantic clause for the conditional relative to an infinite partial order ≤
from [9, 40]
M |= ϕ ψ iff for all w ∈ JϕK there is a v ≤ w with v ∈ JϕK
such that u ∈ JψK for all u ≤ v with u ∈ JϕK.
is equivalent to the semantic clause given above with respect to the upset convexity U(≤). Note
that this connection between the order semantics and the semantics in abstract convex geometries
has as a precursor the connection between the order semantics and premise semantics that was
already observed in [27, 38, 28].
4 Completeness for abstract convex geometries
This section contains a completeness result for preferential conditional logic with respect to the
models from section 3.2 that are based on abstract convex geometries. It reads at follows:
Theorem 1. Every one-step formula ϕ ∈ L1 that is consistent in preferential conditional logic is
true in a model of the form (W, C, V ), where W is a finite set and C a convex geometry over W .
This theorem is a consequence of at least two results that already exist in the literature:
1. Theorem 1 can be obtained from the well-know completeness with respect to the semantics
in posets [9, 40] together with the observation from Example 3.7 that every model based on
a poset gives rise to a model based on a convex geometry that satisfies the same formulas.
However, it needs to be checked that the necessary formal proofs go through with our more
restrictive one-step proof system and that the completeness construction yields a finite model
with an anti-symmetric ordering.
2. An alternative approach is to connect to the nonmonotonic consequence relations from [24]
and then apply the duality result from [29]. Observe that every consistent formula ϕ ∈ L1
gives rise to a nonmonotonic consequence relation |∼ satisfying the axioms of System P, by
taking α |∼ β iff ⊢ ϕ → (α  β). If one then moves to the free Boolean algebra over Prop,
which we can assume to be finite, then one is precisely on the algebraic side of the dual
correspondence from [29]. On the spatial side of this duality one then obtains a convex
geometry over the atoms of the free Boolean algebra on Prop.
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For readers who are not comfortable with adapting these existing results we give a direct proof of
Theorem 1.
To prove Theorem 1 we need to define a finite modelM = (W, C, V ) such thatM |= ϕ. We first
discuss the definition of the domain W and the valuation V : Prop → PW . We let W be the set
of all assignments a : Prop → {0, 1} in the sense of classical propositional logic. This set is finite
because we can assume Prop to be finite since there are only finitely many propositional letters
occurring in ϕ. The valuation V : Prop→ PW is defined such that V (p) = {a ∈W | a(p) = 1} for
all p ∈ Prop. By the completeness result for classical propositional logic we have that JαKV ⊆ JβKV
iff ⊢ α→ β for all α, β ∈ L0. We use this fact in the continuation of this proof without explicitly
mentioning it. We also need that for every set Y ⊆W there is a characteristic formula χ(Y ) ∈ L0
such that Jχ(Y )K = Y . Because Prop and W are finite we can define χ(Y ) =
∨
a∈Y χ(a) where
χ(a) =
∧
{p | a(p) = 1} ∧
∧
{¬p | a(p) = 0}.
To describe the convex geometry C we first define Σ to be any maximally consistent set of L1
formulas with that ϕ ∈ Σ. Such a set exists because ϕ is consistent. Below we are implicitly going
to make use of the fact that Σ is closed under provable implications, that is, if ⊢
∧
Σ′ → ρ for
some Σ′ ⊆ Σ then ρ ∈ Σ. We then define the family of convex sets as follows:
C = {C ⊆W | JαK ∩ JβK ⊆ C implies JαK ⊆ C for all α, β ∈ L0 with α β ∈ Σ}.
Define the model M = (W, C, V ). To finish the proof of Theorem 1 we need to verify that C
is a convex geometry and that M |= ϕ. It is straight-forward to check that C is closed under
intersection. Thus it follows from Lemma 4.2 below, which states that C has the anti-exchange
property, that C is a convex geometry. That M |= ϕ follows from Lemma 4.3, which states that
M |= θ iff θ ∈ Σ for all θ ∈ L1.
To prove Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 we need the following syntactic characterization of the convex
hull operator in C:
h : PW → PW,
Y 7→
⋃
{JδK ⊆W | δ  χ(Y ) ∈ Σ}.
It is possible to show that h is the closure operator associated to the meet semilattice C ⊆ PW .
We do not do this here because the completeness proof only needs the following weaker properties
of h:
Lemma 4.1. For all Y ⊆W it holds that
1. Y ⊆ h(Y ), and
2. h(Y ) ∈ C.
Proof. For item 1 observe that by (Id) we have that ⊢ χ(Y ) χ(Y ). Thus ⊢ ϕ→ (χ(Y ) χ(Y ))
and hence Y = Jχ(Y )K ⊆ h(Y ) by the definition of h.
For item 2 take any α, β ∈ L0 such that α β ∈ Σ and JαK∩JβK ⊆ h(Y ). We need to show that
then JαK ⊆ h(Y ). BecauseW is finite it follows from JαK∩JβK ⊆ h(Y ) that there are finitely many
δ1, . . . , δn ∈ L0 with JαK ∩ JβK ⊆ Jδ1K ∪ · · · ∪ JδnK and δi  χ(Y ) ∈ Σ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. From
the former we get that ⊢ (α∧β)→ (δ1∨· · ·∨δn). Because of (RW) we obtain ⊢ α (δ1∨· · ·∨δn)
because by (Id) and (And) we have that ⊢ α  α ∧ β. From the latter, that δi  χ(Y ) ∈ Σ for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it follows with multiple applications of (Or) that δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn  χ(Y ) ∈ Σ.
Because of the (CCut’) from Proposition 3.1 we get that α ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn  χ(Y ) ∈ Σ. By the
definition of h we get that JαK ⊆ h(Y ).
Lemma 4.2. C has the anti-exchange property.
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Proof. Consider any C ∈ C and x 6= y with x, y /∈ C. We derive a contradiction from the
assumption that for all D ∈ C with C ⊆ D we have x ∈ D iff y ∈ D.
If this assumption was true then it follows that y ∈ h(χ(C ∪ {x})) because x ∈ h(χ(C ∪ {x})),
C ⊆ h(χ(C ∪ {x})) and h(χ(C ∪ {x})) ∈ C. Thus there is some δy ∈ L0 such that y ∈ JδxK
and δy  χ(C ∪ {x}) ∈ Σ. Because ⊢ χ(C ∪ {x}) → χ(C ∪ {x, y}) it follows from the derived
rule (R) in Proposition 3.1 that (δy ∧ χ(C ∪ {x, y})) ∨ χ(C ∪ {x})  χ(C ∪ {x}) ∈ Σ. One can
check that (JδyK ∩ (C ∪ {x, y})) ∪ (C ∪ {x}) = C ∪ {x, y}. Thus it follows with (LLE) that
χ(C ∪ {x, y}) χ(C ∪ {x}) ∈ Σ.
If we interchange the roles of x and y in the reasoning from the previous paragraph we obtain
that also χ(C ∪ {x, y})  χ(C ∪ {y}) ∈ Σ. Thus with the help of (And) we can deduce ⊢
χ(C ∪ {x, y}) (χ(C ∪ {x}) ∧ χ(C ∪ {y})) ∈ Σ from which we get χ(C ∪ {x, y}) χ(C) ∈ Σ by
(RW). This contradicts C ∈ C because Jχ(C ∪ {x, y})K∩ Jχ(C)K ⊆ C but Jχ(C ∪ {x, y})K * C.
Lemma 4.3. For all θ ∈ L1 it holds that
M |= θ iff θ ∈ Σ.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is an induction on the complexity of L1. The cases for the Boolean
operators are straightforward. Thus we only treat the base case where θ = α β.
For the right-to-left direction assume that α  β ∈ Σ. To prove M |= α  β we show that
JαK ⊆ co(JαK ∩ JβK), where co denotes the convex hull operator of the convex geometry C. Thus
we need to show that JαK ⊆ C for every convex set C ∈ C with JαK∩JβK ⊆ C. This follows directly
from the definition of C.
For the other direction assume that M |= α  β. This means that JαK ⊆ co(JαK ∩ JβK). Be-
cause by Lemma 4.1 h(JαK ∩ JβK) is a convex set containing JαK∩JβK it follows that co(JαK ∩ JβK) ⊆
h(JαK ∩ JβK). Thus JαK ⊆ h(JαK ∩ JβK). Because W is finite it follows from the definition of h that
there are δ1, . . . , δn such that JαK ⊆ Jδ1K ∪ · · · ∪ JδnK and δi  α ∧ β ∈ Σ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. It
follows from the former with the help of (Id) and (RW) that ⊢ α δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn. With the use of
(Or) we get from the latter that δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn  α ∧ β ∈ Σ. With the help of (CCut’), which is
derivable according to Proposition 3.1, it follows that α ∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn  α ∧ β ∈ Σ. Because of
(WCM) from Proposition 3.1 we obtain that (α∨ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn)∧α β ∈ Σ and by (LLE) we get
α β ∈ Σ.
5 Morphisms of convex geometries
In this section we recall the notion of a morphism between convex geometries from [29]. The
motivation for this notion is that in the finite case they are precisely the functions that preserve
and reflect the truth of all conditionals. It should be mentioned that our notion of morphism can
not be straight-forwardly adapted to the infinite case as its adequacy relies on the reformulation
of the semantics from Proposition 3.4, which only holds in the finite case.
The definition of a morphism uses the following existential and universal image maps: For
every f : W → U we write f∃ : PX → PY for the left adjoint and f∀ : PX → PY for the right
adjoint of the inverse image map f−1 : PU → PW,X 7→ {w ∈ W | f(w) ∈ X}. Concretely, this
means that
f∃(Y ) = {u ∈ U | f−1({u}) ∩ Y 6= ∅}, and
f∀(Y ) = {u ∈ U | f−1({u}) ⊆ Y }.
It is easy to check that f∃(Y ) = f∀(Y ) for all Y ⊆W . Note that f∃ is just the usual direct image
map.
A morphism f from a convex geometry (W, C) to a convex geometry (U,D) is a function
f : W → U such that f∀(C) ∈ D for all C ∈ C. The morphism f is a strong morphism if it
additionally satisfies that for every D ∈ D there is some C ∈ C such that D = f∀(C). Thus,
strong morphism are precisely the functions for which D = {f∀(C) ⊆ U | C ∈ C}. By dualizing
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and exploiting f∃(Y ) = f∀(Y ) one can adapt this definition of morphism to the feasible sets of a
convex geometry. A morphism is then a function f such that f∃(F ) is feasible for every feasible
F , and it is strong if every feasible set arises as f∃(F ) for some feasible F .
The reader can convince themself that surjective affine transformation on the plane, such as
translations, rotations or scalings, are strong morphisms.
For posets we have that f : W → U is a morphism between the upset convexities of partial
orders ≤ on W and ≤′ on U if and only if it satisfies the following condition, which is just the
back condition on bounded morphism in modal logic:
• For all w ∈W and u′ ≤′ f(w) there is a u ≤ w such that f(u) = w.
The morphism f is strong if and only if it additionally satisfies the following condition:1
• For all u ∈ U there is a w ∈W such that f(w) = u and for all w′ ≤ w we have f(w′) ≤′ u.
Note that these two conditions on the graph of f correspond to the conditions on bisimulations
between models based on posets from [42].
A further example of a morphism comes from the following proposition. It shows that removing
impossible worlds from a model yeilds a submodel that embeds with a strong morphism. As a
consequence impossible worlds can be removed without altering the truth of one-step formulas.
Proposition 5.1. Let (W, C) be any convex geometry and let I =
⋂
C. Define U =W \ I and let
D be the relative convexity of U in W . Then ∅ ∈ D and the embedding e : U → W,u 7→ u is a
strong morphism from (U,D) to (W, C).
Proof. That ∅ ∈ D follows because, by the closure of C under arbitrary intersection we have that
I ∈ C, and thus ∅ = I ∩ U ∈ D by the definition of the relative convexity. To see that e is a
strong morphism it is easier to reason with the feasible sets. The worlds in I do not appear in any
feasible set from (W, C) and thus it is clear that the feasible sets in (W, C) are precisely the direct
images of feasible sets from (U,D).
We can lift the notion of a morphism to models in the standard way. That is, f :W → W ′ is
a morphism from M = (W, C, V ) to M ′ = (W ′, C′, V ′) if f is a morphism from (W, C) to (W ′, C′)
and V (p) = f−1(V ′(p)) for all p ∈ Prop. We call f from M to M ′ strong if it is strong as a
morphism between the underlying convex geometries.
Propositions 10 and 12 from [29] entail that in the finite case strong morphisms preserve and
reflect the truth of conditionals. Because this result is central for our approach we restate the
result in our terminology and provide a self contained proof.
Theorem 5.2. Let f be a strong morphism from a finite model M = (W, C, V ) to a finite model
M ′ = (W ′, C′, V ′) then it holds for all ϕ ∈ L1 that
M |= ϕ iff M ′ |= ϕ.
Proof. First observe that because taking preimages is a Boolean homomorphism between powerset
algebras it is clear that the condition that V (p) = f−1(V ′(p)) for all p ∈ Prop entails that
JϕKV = f
−1(JϕKV ′) for all ϕ ∈ L0.
To prove the preservation of true formulas in L1 one uses a standard induction on the complex-
ity of formulas. We only consider the case for the conditional. Because we are in a finite setting
we can use the equivalent formulation of the semantics from Proposition 3.4, stating that ϕ ψ
is true in a model if JϕK ⊆ co(JϕK ∩ JψK).
Assume first that JϕKV ′ ⊆ co(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′) holds in C
′. To show that then f−1(JϕKV ′) ⊆
co(f−1(JϕKV ′) ∩ f
−1(JψKV ′)) holds in C consider any w /∈ co(f
−1(JϕKV ′) ∩ f
−1(JψKV ′)). This
means that there is some convex C ∈ C such that f−1(JϕKV ′∩JψKV ′) = f
−1(JϕKV ′)∩f
−1(JψKV ′) ⊆
C and w /∈ C. Because f is a morphism it then follows that f∀(C) ∈ C′ and because f∀ is right
1In [29] we made the false claim that the strong morphism between posets are the order preserving and surjective
functions.
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adjoint to f−1 we get JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′ ⊆ f
∀(C). Thus, co(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′) ⊆ f
∀(C) and because by
assumption JϕKV ′ ⊆ f
∀(C). From w /∈ C we have that f(w) /∈ f∀(C) and so f(w) /∈ JϕKV ′ , which
means that w /∈ f−1(JϕKV ′).
For the other direction assume f−1(JϕKV ′) ⊆ co(f
−1(JϕKV ′) ∩ f
−1(JψKV ′)). We show JϕKV ′ ⊆
co(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′) by contraposition. Thus consider any w
′ /∈ co(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′). There then
is some convex C′ ∈ C′ such that JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′ ⊆ C
′ and w′ /∈ C′. Because f is a strong
morphism there exists a C ∈ C such that C′ = f∀(C). Because f∀ is right adjoint to f−1 we
obtain f−1(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′) ⊆ C from JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′ ⊆ C
′ = f∀(C). With f−1(JϕKV ′ ∩ JψKV ′) =
f−1(JϕKV ′)∩f
−1(JψK)V ′ it follows that co(f
−1(JϕKV ′) ∩ f
−1(JψKV ′)) ⊆ C, and by our assumption
f−1(JϕKV ′) ⊆ C. Since w
′ /∈ f∀(C) it must be the case that f−1({w′}) * C. Hence w /∈ JϕKV ′ .
6 Representation of convex geometries in the plane
In this section we show that the representation from Theorem 5 in [32] gives rise to a strong
morphism of convex geometries. It would be possible to show that any such representation of a
finite convex geometry with polygons that have disjoint endpoints yields a strong morphism. Thus,
we could just use Theorem 5 from [32] as a blackbox, without disassembling the inner workings of
the construction in it its proof. But because this construction is at the heart of our completeness
result, we give a detailed exposition of the representation in this section. Figure 6.1 contains an
example of this representation for the convex geometry from Example 3.6.
6.1 Decomposition of finite convex geometries
It is shown in [13] that every finite convex geometry can be decomposed into a family of convexities
arising from linear orders. Using these decompositions is crucial for the results in [32].
The relevant notion of decomposition is the join in the semi-lattice of all convex geometries
over some fixed finite set W , ordered by the inclusion between sets of sets. From Theorem 2.2 in
[12] it follows that the join C ∨D of convex geometries C and D over W can be defined concretely
as
C ∨ D = {C ∩D | C ∈ C and D ∈ D}.
Recall that a partial order ≤ on W is linear if x ≤ y or y ≤ x holds for all x, y ∈ W . The
decomposition result, which is Theorem 5.2 in [13], can be formulated in our notation as follows:
Theorem 6.1. Let C be a convex geometry over a finite set W such that ∅ ∈ C. Then there is a
finite family of linear orders (≤j)mj=1 such that
C =
m∨
j=1
U(≤j). (1)
Note that from the definition of the join it follows that if the posets (≤i)ki=1 are a decomposition
of a convex geometry C according to (1) then some set X ⊆ W is convex if and only if it can be
written as
X =
m⋂
j=1
X↑j, (2)
where X↑j = {w ∈ W | x ≤j w for some x ∈ X} denotes the upwards closure of X in the order
≤j .
6.2 The representation from Richter and Rogers
This subsection contains the proof of Theorem 5 in [32]. For this paper we need following formu-
lation of the representation result:
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α = (⊤ p) ∧ (q  p) ∧
(¬(p↔ q) p) ∧ ¬(¬q  p) ∧
¬((p↔ q) p) ∧ ¬(¬p ¬q)
pqpqpqpq
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pq
pq
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pq
Figure 2: In the upper right corner is a decomposition of the convex geometry from Example 3.6
into linear orders. The main picture contains the representation of this convex geometry in the
plane. In the lower right corner is the formula α from Example 3.6 that is true in this convex
geometry.
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Theorem 2. Let C be a convex geometry over a finite set W such that ∅ ∈ C. Then there is a
finite set U ⊆ R2 and a strong morphism of convex geometries r from (W, C) to U with the relative
convexity from R2.
We first describe how to construct the set U and the function r. Fix a convex geometry (W, C)
such that ∅ ∈ C and let n be the number of elements in W . By Theorem 6.1 there exists a
decomposition of C into linear orders (≤i)mi=1. Assume without loss of generality that m ≥ 2,
otherwise just duplicate one of the linear orders. For every w ∈ W and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} let
rj(w) ∈ N ⊆ R be the rank of w in the linear order ≤j starting from the top. This means that if
≤j is wn <j wn−1 <j · · · <j w1 then rj(w) = i for the unique i with wi = w.
We then choose m-many points on the unit circle that are equally distributed among all
directions. Thus, set dj = (cos(2pij/m), sin(2pij/m)) ∈ R2 for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Define
s ∈ R as
s = max
{
0,
n cos(2pi/m)
1− cos(2pi/m)
}
.
For every w ∈W and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} define the point
u(j, w) = (s+ rj(w))dj ∈ R
2,
and for every w ∈ W define the set Uw = {u(1, w), . . . , u(m,w)}. Clearly we have that Uw∩Uu = ∅
whenever w 6= u. Define U ⊆ R2 as U =
⋃
w∈W U
a and r : U → W such that r(u) is the unique
w ∈W with u ∈ Uw. Note that r−1({w}) = Uw for all w ∈W .
The idea behind the definition of U is to spread out the linear orders in the decomposition of
C along separate rays that move outwards from the origin. On each ray this happens at distance s
away from the origin. This safety distance ensures that every point on some ray is further out from
the origin than the intersection of the ray with any line segment between points on neighboring
rays.
Theorem 2 then follows from the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.2. r is a morphism of convex geometries.
Proof. We need to show that whenever C ⊆ U is convex in the relative convexity of U in R2 then
r∀(C) ∈ C. Thus fix such a C and let D = r∀(C). To show that D is convex in C we use the
characterization (2) and show that D =
⋂m
j=1D↑j. For the non-trivial ⊇-inclusion consider any w
such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} there is some wj ∈ D such that wj ≤j w. To prove w ∈ D = r∀(C)
we need to show that Uw ⊆ co(C).
First observe that the origin (0, 0) is in the convex hull co(C) of C in R2. This is a little technical
but not very interesting: If n is even then the origin can be written as a convex combination of the
points u(wm,m) and u(wm/2,m/2) in C because both points have 0 in their second coordinate,
and the former has a positive but the latter a negative first coordinate. If n is odd then n ≥ 3 and
the points u(wj , j) and u(wk, k), for j = (m− 1)/2 and k = (m+ 1)/2, are in C. They both have
a negative first coordinate and a different signum in their second coordinates. Thus there is some
point s ∈ co(C) that has a negative first coordinate and 0 in the second coordinate. The origin is
then a convex combination of s and u(wm,m).
Consider then any point in Uw, which must be of the form u(w, j) for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Because D = r∀(C) and wj ∈ D we have that u(wj , j) ∈ Uwj = f−1({wj}) ⊆ C. Moreover,
from wj ≤ w it follows that rj(w) ≤ rj(wj) and hence u(w, j) = (s + rj(w))dj is on the line
segment from the origin to u(wj , j) = (s + rj(wj))dj . It follows that u(w, j) ∈ co(C) and thus
that u(w, j) ∈ C, since C is convex in the relative convexity.
Lemma 6.3. r is a strong morphism of convex geometries.
Proof. To show that r is strong consider any D ∈ C. We show that D = r∀(C) for C =
co(r−1(D)) ∩ U . That D ⊆ r∀(C) follows immediately from r−1(D) ⊆ C. To show D ⊇ r∀(C)
consider any w /∈ D. We show that w /∈ r∀(C).
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Because D is convex we can apply the characterization from (2) and conclude that there is
some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that w <j u for all u ∈ D. We then assume without loss of generality
that j = m. This is without loss of generality because one can apply a rotation to turn any ray
for j until it comes to lie on the positive x-axis. Because rotations are isomorphism with respect
to the convex sets this does not influence our reasoning.
To show that w /∈ r∀(C) it suffices to show that u(w,m) /∈ co(r−1(D)). To this aim we show
that the first coordinate of u(w,m) = (s + rm(w))dk is strictly larger than the first coordinate
of any u(v, k) = (s + rk(v))dk for v ∈ D and k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, meaning that u(w,m) can not be
written as the convex combination of such points. If k = m then this is clear because dm = (1, 0)
and rm(w) > rm(v), as w <m v. In the other case where k 6= m first consider the case where
cos(2pi/m) ≥ 0. Then 0 ≤ n cos(2pi/m)1−cos(2pi/m) = s and we can estimate the first coordinate of u(v, k) as
follows:
(s+ rk(v)) cos(2pik/m) ≤ (s+ n) cos(2pik/m)
≤ (s+ n) cos(2pi/m)
≤
(
n cos(2pi/m)
1− cos(2pi/m)
+ n
)
cos(2pi/m)
=
(
n
1− cos(2pi/m)
)
cos(2pi/m)
≤ s
< s+ rm(w)
Because s+rm(w) is the first coordinate of u(w,m) this is the needed inequality. In the other case
where cos(2pi/m) < 0 we get that m ≤ 3. Thus, k/m is either 1/3, 2/3 or 1/2 and so cos(2pik/m)
is negative. It follows that the first coordinate of u(v, k) is also negative and therefore it is smaller
than the first coordinate of u(w,m).
7 Completeness for Euclidean convexity
In this last section we put the results from this paper together to prove the completeness of
preferential conditional logic with respect to convexity between points in the plane. We also show
that this result can not be improved to a completeness result with respect to convexity on the real
line.
The following is the main result of this paper:
Theorem 3. Every one-step formula ϕ ∈ L1 that is consistent in preferential conditional logic is
true in a model of the form M = (W, C, V ), where W ⊆ R2 is a finite set of points and C is the
relative convexity of W in R2.
Proof. From Theorem 1 we obtain a finite model M ′′ = (W ′′, C′′, V ′′) such that M ′′ |= ϕ. From
Proposition 5.1 we get a finite convex geometry (W ′, C′) with ∅ ∈ C′ and strong morphism of
convex geometries r′′ from (W ′, C′) to (W ′′, C′′). We can then apply Theorem 2 to obtain a finite
set W ⊆ R2 together with a strong morphism r′ from (W, C) to (W ′, C′) such that C is the relative
convexity of W in R2.
Let r = r′ ◦ r′′ be the composition of r′′ with r′. Clearly, this is also a strong morphism of
convex geometries from (W, C) to (W ′′, C′′). Then define the model M = (W, C, V ) such that
V (p) = r−1(V ′′(p)) for all p ∈ Prop. This turns r into a strong morphism from the model M to
the model M ′′ and thus M |= ϕ follows with Theorem 5.2.
Remark 7.1. To adapt this completeness result to nested preferential conditional logic one would
need to consider models (W,U, V ) whereW ⊆ R2 and U :W → PW . The function U fixes a finite
set of points U(w) for every world w ∈ W . At a worlds w ∈ W a conditional is then evaluated in
the relative convexity of U(w) in R2. Completeness with respect to such models can be obtained
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by starting from a model in the semantics from Remark 3.2 and then applying Theorem 3 locally
to C(w) for every world w. By suitably translating the points in the sets U(w) one can ensure
that U(w) ∩ U(w′) = ∅ whenever w 6= w′. Thus, the valuation V : W → PProp can be defined
globally on W .
The completeness result from Theorem 3 can not be improved to a completeness with respect
to models based on subsets of the real line. The reason is that such models validate additional
formulas that are not provable in preferential conditional logic. As a first example consider the
formula
γ2 = (p ∨ q ∨ r  p ∨ q) ∨ (p ∨ q ∨ r  p ∨ r) ∨ (p ∨ q ∨ r  q ∨ r).
It can be seen as a generalization of the formula γ1 = (p∨ q  p)∨ (p∨ q  q), which is valid over
linear orders. Using soundness of the semantics over posets it is easy to see that γ2 is not derivable
in preferential conditional logic. However, one can show that γ2 is validated by all models of the
form (W, C, V ), where W ⊆ R is finite and C is the relative convexity of W in R. The argument
is roughly that we just need to consider the two propositional letters among p, q and r that are
true at the at most two extreme points of Jp ∨ q ∨ rK. Note that these extreme points are simply
the minimal and maximal elements of Jp ∨ q ∨ rK in the standard order of the reals.
Surprisingly, γ2 can be invalidated if we allow W to be an infinite subset of R. This shows
that the conditional logic of finite sets of points on the real line is different from the logic of the
whole real line. To invalidate γ2 it suffices to consider a model (R, C, V ), where C is the standard
convexity on R and V is such that for every propositional letter in {p, q, r} there are arbitrarily
large and arbitrarily small reals at which the propositional letter is true.
The logic of infinite subsets of the real line is still stronger than preferential conditional logic.
To see this consider the formula
δ2 = (p ∨ q ∨ r  s)→ (p ∨ q  s) ∨ (p ∨ r  s) ∨ (q ∨ r  s).
This formula is a generalization of the formula δ1 = (p ∨ q  s)→ (p  s) ∨ (q  s) expressing
disjunctive rationality, which is valid over interval orders. Using the order semantics it is not hard
to show that δ2 is not derivable in preferential conditional logic. But δ2 is valid in models that
are based on the real line:
Proposition 7.2. The formula δ2 is valid in all models of the form (W, C, V ), where W ⊆ R is
any set of points on the line and C is the relative convexity of W in R.
Proof. Consider a model M = (W, C, V ) such that W ⊆ R and C is the relative convexity of W in
R. To show that δ2 is valid assume that M |= p ∨ q ∨ r  s.
Define pr ∈ {p, q, r} such that for all u ∈ Jp ∨ q ∨ rK there is some v ∈ JprK with u ≤ v. Such a
pr must exist. Otherwise, we have for all a ∈ {p, q, r} a ua ∈ Jp ∨ q ∨ rK such that v < ua for all
v ∈ JaK. This leads to a contradiction by considering the maximum of up, uq and ur, which is in
Jp ∨ q ∨ rK, but can not be in any of JpK, JqK and JrK. Analogously, we define pl ∈ {p, q, r} such
that for all u ∈ Jp ∨ q ∨ rK there is some v ∈ JplK with v ≤ u. Let A = {a1, a2} be one of {p, q},
{p, r}, or {q, r} such that {pr, pl} ⊆ A.
We claim that then M |= a1 ∨ a2  s. To see this consider any convex set C ∈ C such that
Ja1 ∨ a2K * C. Thus, there is some world u ∈ Ja1 ∨ a2K such that u /∈ C. Because C is convex it
follows that the worlds in C are either all to the left or are all to the right of u. Assume without
loss of generality that all worlds of C are to the left of u, that is, v < u for all v ∈ C. Let
C′ = (−∞, u) be the convex set of all worlds that are strictly to the left of u. Clearly C ⊆ C′ and
u /∈ C′. From the latter it follows that Jp ∨ q ∨ rK * C′, because u ∈ Ja1 ∨ a2K ⊆ Jp ∨ q ∨ rK.
From the assumption that M |= p ∨ q ∨ r  s it follows that there is some convex set D with
C′∩Jp ∨ q ∨ rK ⊆ D and Jp ∨ q ∨ rK * D such that Jp ∨ q ∨ rK ⊆ D∪JsK. From C′∩Jp ∨ q ∨ rK ⊆ D
it follows that C∩Ja1 ∨ a2K ⊆ D and from Jp ∨ q ∨ rK ⊆ D∪JsK it follows that Ja1 ∨ a2K ⊆ D∪JsK.
It thus only remains to be seen that Ja1 ∨ a2K * D. Because Jp ∨ q ∨ rK * D there is some
u′ ∈ Jp ∨ q ∨ rK such that u′ /∈ D. Observe first that u ≤ u′ because (−∞, u) = C′ ⊆ D. By the
choice of pr there is then a v
′ ∈ JprK such that u′ ≤ v′. Clearly v′ ∈ Ja1 ∨ a2K. We also have
v′ /∈ D because D is convex, u′ /∈ D, u− 42 ∈ C′ ⊆ D and u− 42 < u ≤ u′ < v′.
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8 Conclusion
We have shown that preferential conditional logic is complete with respect to convexity over finite
sets of points on the plane. Because of the validities discussed in Section 7 this result can not be
strengthened to convexity on the real line. There seem two be two natural directions to continue
this line of research. First, one might ask what is the logic of finite sets of points on the line
and what is the logic of the real line. As our examples also show these logics are not the same.
Second, one might try to strengthen our completeness result. Most interesting would be to show
completeness with respect to convexity over the complete plane, analogously to the completeness
of S4 with respect to the standard topology on the full real line:
Problem 8.1. Is preferential conditional logic complete with respect to models of the form (R2, C, V ),
where C is the standard convexity and V any valuation?
It might be simpler to first show completeness with respect to bounded regions in the plane.
A plausible conjecture of this kind is the following:
Problem 8.2. Is preferential conditional logic complete with respect to models of the form (U, C, V ),
where U ⊆ R2 is regular, compact and convex, C is the relative convexity of U in R2, V is a val-
uation that sends all propositional letters to regular closed sets, and the propositional connectives
are interpreted over the Boolean algebra of regular closed sets?
Note that by the Krein-Milman Theorem compact sets are in the closure of their extreme
points. Thus, one might hope that for the semantics of the conditional they still behave similar
to finite sets.
Another question for further research is how conditional logic relates to other modal logics that
have been developed to reason about convexity or lines in space. Examples are the bimodal logics
of lines and points from [6, 41] or the logics of the one-step convexity and betweenness modalities
in [4]. It seems that the expressivity of the conditional is weak compared to the modalities in these
logics. Thus, one might hope to find interpretations of preferential conditional logic into some of
these more expressive logics.
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